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THE mainstream practitioners of both M arx­ian and bourgeois economics have until 
recently been content to assume that, on the time 
scale on which they were operating, there was no 
need to worry about the global exhaustion of 
depletable natural resources. Nor were they 
overly worried about the capacity of the air, 
rivers, lakes and seas to absorb the wastes of 
modern industrial development and its attendant 
consumption patterns.
In the case of the socialist countries, the 
requirements of developing productive capacity as 
a pre-requisite to the resolution of the class 
struggle on an international basis has provided 
a rationale for ignoring problems of pollution and 
resource depletion. Such matters, it is argued, 
are merely technical in nature and can be resolved 
once the class struggle is won.
For the capitalist countries, an ever-expanding 
frontier of development into colonies and open 
spaces (such as Australia and N orth America) 
has historically provided the basis for the resolu­
tion of the problem of scarce and depletable 
resources, coupled with the possibilities of re­
locating the worst polluting industries away from 
the metropolitan centres. In this respect, the USA 
saves some air pollution by its foreign trade 
pattern — it imports goods which, if produced at 
home, would pollute more than the production of 
export goods needed to purchase the imports. 
Japan is increasingly looking for ways to solve 
some of its pollution problems by actively encour­
aging such a process. Some Australian business­
men with an eye for profits are already arguing 
for not-too-stringent anti-pollution laws so that 
some new ‘dirty ’ industries can be established here 
where our wide-open spaces will allow for cheap 
dispersion of the wastes.
In recent years the results of the neglect of 
problems of ecology and the environm ent have 
become more and more evident. W hilst there have 
always been individuals and groups concerned 
with such issues, it has taken major environmental 
crises to bring the issue to the point where it is 
now a p an  of conventional wisdom to acknow­
ledge the problem.
My comments here are chiefly directed at the 
possibilities of resolving these problems under
market capitalism, with particular reference to 
Australia. W hilst it m ight easily be concluded that 
such problems would be more easily resolved 
under socialism, the reasoning above suggests why 
this may not be so, at least in the immediate 
future.
Bourgeois economics has traditionally treated 
problems of pollution and the environment under 
the heading of ‘externalities’. These are taken to 
be all costs and benefits arising from economic 
activities which are external to the initiating 
economic ‘u n it’ (worker, factory, household, e tc .). 
I t is usually argued that if such external effects 
are beneficial but cannot be charged for in the 
price of the product either for institutional or 
technical reasons, then there is a case for a subsidy 
from governments. Such arguments are commonly 
used in the context of western capitalist countries 
(both ‘legitimately’ and ‘illegitimately’) to obtain 
government assistance for various industries or 
to bolster arguments favouring foreign invest­
ment. Examples in Australia are easy to find — 
General Motors is supposed to have provided 
free of charge an enormous am ount of technical 
advice to its suppliers which in turn was beneficial 
to other customers of these suppliers. Similarly, 
supposed external benefits from the development 
of particular industries, or from the development 
of industry in general, have often been used to 
justify Australian government assistance in the 
form of tariff protection.
W hat is interesting about the development of 
the environment issue is that the boot is moving to 
the other foot. Now that the external costs of 
all kinds of producing and consuming activities 
(e.g. the car) are being recognised, the suggestion 
is in the air that costs (in the form of taxes, 
required installation of pollution control devices, 
or the ceasing of profitable but pollution acti­
vities) will be imposed on such behaviour. Not 
surprisingly, the PR  agents of many big companies 
are trying to nullify and defuse the issue, both by 
presenting a new image of environmental concern 
and by beginning to make token concessions 
towards ‘cleaning u p ’ their activities or products. 
But quite apart from the question of the political 
economy of pollution, what are the chances of 
effectively handling the problem of the environ­
ment by using the m arket mechanism?
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It is readily acknowledged by bourgeios econo­
mists that the price mechanism is in principle 
unable to handle many of the key environmental 
problems, even if it were possible to extend 
property rights so that only those who paid the 
price would receive any benefits. For example, how 
can ‘consumers’ show their ‘preferences’ for the 
‘natural’ vs. the ‘expanded’ Lake Pedder? Or, in 
the jargon, how much would people (Tasmanians? 
Australians? Humans?) be prepared to pay to keep 
Lake Pedder in its natural form? In such cases, 
it is only through political processes that such 
decisions can be made. Yet because of his instinctive 
distrust of ‘inefficient’ and often ‘irrational’ poli­
tical processes, the bourgeois economist has two 
answers in his ‘tool-kit’ to handle problems of 
market failure outside of the political arena. 
T he first line of defence is to try to extend property 
rights or fix up institutional arrangements so that 
the external effects are picked up by the price 
mechanism. Here, the mind boggles at the kind of 
society we would have if this first remedy were 
pushed very far — users of National Parks would 
have to pay the full cost of m aintaining the park 
and preventing the market-value of the park falling 
so that it would become an attractive commercial 
proposition for an alternative activity (strip m in­
ing?) . O r if one wished to go to an unpolluted 
beach, one would have to expect to pay a price, 
either the cost of cleaning up the beach, plus 
the cost of keeping out the polluted water from 
the next beach, or the cost of travel to a naturally 
unpolluted beach.
The second line of theoretical defence of the 
bourgeois economist is to use scientific ‘cost/ 
benefit’ analysis for those consum ption/production/ 
investment decisions where there is no market for 
the ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘service’ in question, or where 
the market mechanism is inappropriate. Thus the 
decision to flood/not flood Lake Pedder ought to 
be made by government on the basis of assessment 
of the costs and benefits of each alternative. If a 
‘bad’ market exists (e.g. kangaroos for pet food), 
it regulates the private market out of existence 
if necessary and undertakes the ‘appropriate’ 
activity itself, or supplements and controls the 
private market by running public institutions 
alongside private ones (e.g. reserves to  preserve 
w ildlife).
It is clear from these examples that the first 
remedy cannot be pushed too far. Not only is it 
costly to ‘exclude’ the crap from the next beach 
and build barricades around the clean beach to 
keep out non-paying customers, but the very idea 
of ‘building the barricades’ transforms the nature 
of the beach, with the ‘price’ providing an effective 
filter to keep out the poor, etc. T o  argue that 
there is an alternative to cleaning up the beach 
—the unpolluted distant beach — pushes the 
problem under the rug. It works only while few 
people use the far-off golden sands (Gold Coast? 
Fiji?) — as lower transport costs and higher 
incomes lead to a swelling tourist horde, while 
the oiltankers churn by, the day of reckoning for 
the far off golden sands is here right now.
The second remedy — the use of rational cost/ 
benefit calculation by government, or regulation 
to eliminate or control ‘bad’ markets — does not 
really overcome the problem of elim inating expli­
citly political judgments from the decision­
making process. For the assessments of the costs 
and benefits of the alternatives are by their very 
nature highly subjective. Similarly, the decision 
as to where the market mechanism has failed and 
what should be done about it is very much a 
political choice. One of the few cases where an 
Australian government undertook a cost/benefit 
analysis of a large investment scheme was the Ord 
River irrigation project. In  that study, results 
were pretty much cooked to give the desired 
answer by calculating a valuation that Australians 
had supposedly placed on northern development 
in the past. In retrospect, the blatantly political 
nature of many government investment decisions 
which have had serious environmental consequences 
reflect the extraordinarily high ‘valuation’ which 
has been placed on development for its own sake. 
In  the case of the W esternport Bay industrial 
project, there is little doubt about the private 
benefits of the scheme, but what is not so well 
known is that the results of a total (private and 
public) cost/benefit analysis are not so clear, 
even without extensive consideration of the 
environmental issue; in effect, there is a consid­
erable government subsidy for the private devel­
opment of the area.
T he problem of who decides when the market 
mechanism has failed is very much a political 
issue. For in many cases of ‘failure’ of the market 
mechanism, with serious ecological effects, there 
exists a flourishing market which would have to 
be stopped by regulation before the ‘rational’ 
decision-making processes could begin. An example 
which springs quickly to m ind is the case of rare 
birds/anim als/prim itive art. In this case, the act 
of ‘consumption’ — looking at the b ird /an im al/ 
art piece does not destroy the original object. 
Apart from storage and presentation costs, there 
is no intrinsic cost of the object being ‘consumed’. 
Hence, the case is strong for preservation of such 
objects of ‘consumption’ in their natural envir­
onm ent with appropriate viewing facilities or in 
museums. Yet because of their scarcity, such objects 
have very high private m arket prices, making 
preservation both technically and politically diffi­
cult. This is illustrated by the recent discovery 
of the continued black-market exporting of Niu- 
ginian art pieces in spite of a ban on such 
activities. I t remains to be seen whether or not 
stronger enforcement measures will be effective 
enough to prevent this intrusion of the ‘m arket’ 
taking away the best N iuginian art from Niu- 
ginians.
A final theoretical problem  of pollution under 
market capitalism is the question of the future. 
I t  is well understood that competitive capitalism 
has a relatively short view of the future, especially 
in boom-time. T he farmer, the factory-owner or 
the wood-cutter is often uninterested in more than 
quick profits, witness the despoliation of forests
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and erosion of farm lands which has characterised 
boom phases of capitalist growth, or the condi­
tions in and around factories as industrialisation 
began. T he monopolisation of industry and the 
increased intervention of the state has done much 
to lengthen the time horizon on which capitalism 
operates, so that such gross excesses are no longer 
so profitable. Can the view of the future be 
extended far enough under capitalism so that man 
can begin to live in harmony with his environ­
ment, and find it profitable to do so? Maybe, 
but it is hard to imagine, in the very long term, 
for the low interest/profit rates im plied by a 
longer view of the future have in the past m eant 
crisis and unemployment for capitalism. In the 
interim, it should be recognised that the develop­
ment ol new anti-pollution economic activities 
may well be very profitable, leading to the devel­
opment of new ‘growth’ industries (witness the 
boom in the share prices for the company with 
the American franchise on the Wankel rotary 
eng ine).
T he particular instances of the breakdown of 
the market mechanism mentioned so far do not 
emphasise the interaction of so many of the 
decisions which affect the environment. Nor do 
they come to grips with the dom ination of political 
processes by producer interests, capitalist and 
integrated unions. In the case of wasteful Austra­
lian irrigation projects, the political power of 
farmers is crucial. In the case of the automobile, 
the strategic position of the automobile industry 
in the economy means any action against the car, 
either on environmental grounds or to try to 
switch people back to public transport, is likely 
at present to generate both capitalist and worker 
opposition. For with unions operating within the 
context of the market system, it is quite rational 
to struggle for short-term employment security 
in the industry of employment whilst also engag­
ing in struggle to gain that security via a radical 
change in society so that individual workers do 
not personally bear the costs of changes in the 
structure of the economy which are carried out 
in the general interest.
In this respect, the recent threats in America by 
the Ford motor company to close down for a year 
in 1975 unless the deadline for the enforcement 
of the USA Clean Air Act is extended puts the 
UAW very much on the spot: to fight the threat­
ened lock-out by demanding Ford compliance with 
the existing schedule for the introduction of anti­
pollution devices? — or to support demands for a 
slow-down of the introduction of the costly anti­
pollution devices in return for a possible greater 
wage-hike from Ford?
Another example of the dom ination of producer 
interests is the air transport industry. In  that case, 
government investment in facilities for air travel 
are made available to airlines very cheaply, so 
that the small section of the population who use/ 
run  planes do not pay the full costs of their 
activities, even without taking into account envir­
onm ental effects. This is particularly so with the 
coming eras of supersonic air travel. T h e  astrono­
mical development costs of the Concorde have 
been paid out of public monies, and justified in 
part by the supposed ‘external’ benefits to British 
and French industry. T he rest is to be recouped 
from the first-class-only passengers, most of whom 
will be expense-account businessmen with a built- 
in government subsidy on travel costs. T o  be sure, 
they will get there a bit faster, especially if they 
use a helicopter to travel to and from the airport 
rather than using slow ground transport. T he 
impact on the environment is underlined by the 
astronomical increase in energy usage to gain 
the extra speed — about six times the am ount 
of fuel per passenger mile in comparison with 
the jum bo jet. (This says nothing about the 
thousands of supersonic military planes which 
have similar environmental effects — Australia 
alone has over 100 such aircraft — nor about 
the environmental effects of existing sub-sonic jet 
air travel.)
T he analysis of m arket break-down does not 
take into account the way in which values and 
tastes are generated — the power of the auto­
mobile advertiser to appeal to the individualistic 
and aggressive desire to own a bigger, faster and 
more expensive car, regardless of the effects on 
environment, etc., ra ther than to appeal to more 
collective and social desires so that a more 
rational public transport system could be used. 
For to build an effective public transport system 
would require an attack on the prevailing concept 
of the role of the car in our society as well as 
the investment in public transport to provide the 
necessary alternative. It would also require action 
to transform the urban environment so the m ajor­
ity preference for living in inner suburbs (shown 
by a recent Age poll) could be realised at a 
price people could afford. Yet where a private 
market for land operates, moves by a government 
planning authority lead to speculative purchases 
and sales of land which can only hamper effective 
planning. In  this respect, the deference of the 
ALP to the Australian ‘religion’ of individual 
hom e/garden ownership is understandable but 
discouraging — the recent announcements sug­
gesting that a Federal ALP government would 
increase subsidies for home ownership will only 
increase pressure for expanding existing m etro­
politan areas with their attendant encroachment 
on open spaces, ra ther than paving the way for a 
rationalisation of suburban land use.
In the face of the difficulties outlined of using 
the ‘m arket’ to solve many of the environmental 
problems, what steps can be taken to modify 
economic activity so that environmental issues are 
taken into account? W hilst there is obviously 
scope for political action at every level to change 
priorities within the existing structure of society, 
the development of direct action in the form 
of strikes/boycotts on environmental issues (such 
as the ethane pipeline under Port Phillip Bay) 
is particularly encouraging from a radical per­
spective, especially since such actions are often 
against the immediate economic interests of the 
workers involved.
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